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Sex and Social Order: The Selective
Enforcement of Colonial American
Adultery Laws in the English Context
Mary Beth Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power
and the Forming of American Society. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1996. Pp. x, 496. $35.00.
Carolyn B. Ramsey*
Legal scholars and historians have found the subordination of
women inscribed in literature, art, family conduct manuals, and, of
course, in the law. Yet our heightened awareness that gender is a
"question of power"' may have led us to overestimate the extent to
which any theory of social relations permeates daily interactions
between ordinary people. In Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered
Power and the Forming of American Society,2 Mary Beth Norton
attempts to explain foundational shifts in American political
philosophy by delving into the earthy records of sexual crimes in
seventeenth-century America. She charts the course of myriad court
cases to show the gradual exclusion of the state from the intimate
lives of the early settlers.3 The result is a fascinating but flawed book.
According to Norton, demographic differences between New
England and the southern colonies resulted in the emergence in
Maryland and Virginia of a theory of gendered power that "severed
the link between family and state" and justified the southern courts'
* Carolyn B. Ramsey is a third-year law student and doctoral candidate in British History
at Stanford University. She will clerk for Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in 1998-1999. The author would like to thank Professor Thomas
Grey and Professor Paul Seaver for their valuable insights and guidance. Throughout this Book
Review, she has modernized spelling, punctuation, and capitalization in all quotations from 17th-
and 18th-century printed and manuscript sources.
1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32,40 (1987).
2. MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND
THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996).
3. See id. at 14, 404.
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reluctance to monitor sexual behavior.4 Norton associates two
theories of power with the incongruous development of New England
and the Chesapeake. Immigrants to New England arrived in families
headed by men whose patriarchal authority bolstered the divinely
ordained hierarchy in which they believed.5 An apologist for the
Stuart monarchy, Sir Robert Filmer saw the family and the state as
analogous institutions: The subject's subservience to his king mirrored
the subjection of Eve to Adam.6 The state thus had a vital interest in
regulating family life and limiting sexual intercourse to the marriage
bed. Norton argues that the dominance of Filmerian thinking in New
England resulted in the rigorous enforcement of a criminal code that
punished consensual acts of adultery, fornication, and sodomy.7
The divergent landscape of the Chesapeake was poor soil on which
to erect a Filmerian society. Indeed, the disproportionate numbers of
men (who sometimes shared female sexual partners) and single
servants (who could not marry) made the analogy of the family to a
little kingdom largely irrelevant.8 Anticipating the writings of John
Locke by half a century, settlers in Maryland and Virginia gradually
abandoned family metaphors in favor of a dichotomous theory of
power in which the polity arose from contractual arrangements
between men.9 Chaotic sexual relations occurred in a separate sphere,
generally ignored by the criminal courts unless a woman brought an
economically burdensome bastard into the community." According
to Norton, the de facto zone of privacy that the southerners created
foreshadowed the more permissive sexual culture of the eighteenth
century.1
Norton's tidy scheme is not very convincing. She imports two
political theorists-Locke and Filmer-from England. Yet, by focusing
narrowly on colonial American law enforcement, she ignores the
longstanding tension between English reformers of varying religious
stripes and a resilient popular culture that either tolerated informal
sexual unions or inflicted extralegal punishments that alarmed
reformers as much as the illicit sex did. 2 Further analysis of adul-
tery, a crime briefly discussed in Norton's book, helps illuminate
colonial sexual regulation in the context of the English experience.
Viewed in this light, the prosecution of adulterous couples in colonial
4. See id. at 5, 323-58.
5. See id. at 13.
6. See id. at 4, 8.
7. See id. at 335-47.
8. See id. at 3-14, 48, 321-22, 402, 404.
9. See id. at 12.
10. See id. at 337, 347.
11. See id. at 404.
12. See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
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America was merely a chapter in an ineffectual English campaign to
control the sexuality of both men and women. The anomaly lay not
in the Chesapeake's reluctance to prosecute offenders (for English
churchwardens often turned a blind eye to sexual misconduct), but in
New England's doomed attempt to make adultery a capital crime.
Describing seventeenth-century New England as a Filmerian society
tells us little about why some New Englanders believed that adultery
should be punished with death, and even less about why most
magistrates and jurors in the north hesitated to inflict capital
punishment for consensual heterosexual offenses. This Book Review
examines the failure of the capital adultery laws and concludes that
neither the formal law nor a patriarchal ideal preordained the
punishment of adultery suspects.
Part I argues that Norton exaggerates both the patriarchalism of
New England and the uniqueness of the Chesapeake. Rather than
presaging Lockean ideas, the Chesapeake adhered to mild forms of
communal policing that were prevalent in England before the English
Civil War. Part II contends that Norton gives short shrift to two
factors militating against the enforcement of sexual morals: eviden-
tiary problems and local loyalties tied to the suspect's wealth, race,
political or religious persuasion, and ability to get along with her
neighbors.
I. LOCKE AND LEWD BEHAVIOR: WAS THE CHESAPEAKE A
LABORATORY FOR IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE?
A. Structure of the Book
Norton's tripartite division of social and political life into the
family, the "informal public," and the state provides the or-
ganizational scheme for Founding Mothers and Fathers. The section
devoted to the family describes relationships between male household
heads and their wives, children, and servants in New England and in
the Chesapeake.13 It also documents the ambiguous position of
wealthy widows who ran their own households and demanded
deference within the Filmerian hierarchy, especially from men of
lower social status.14
With a perplexing disregard for Puritanism and Puritan opposition
to absolute rule, Norton associates New England family government
with Filmer's royalist ideology, which made the husbands and fathers
the heads of a little kingdom. 5 Men in New England were even
13. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 27-137.
14. See id at 139-80.
15. See, e.g., id. at 16 (stating that "the most Filmerian government was that of New Haven,"
1998]
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more patriarchal than their English counterparts, according to Norton.
They could veto their children's choice of spouses,16 and their
criminal codes prescribed the death penalty for sex with a married
woman even before a similar law was enacted in England. 7 Al-
though women often failed to conform to the ideal of the submissive
wife, they did so at their peril, in Norton's view.18 Even a high-status
woman like Mistress Ann Hibbens might be excommunicated from
her church for suggesting that the Bible instructed men to "hearken
unto" their wives.19
In both north and south, women's legal subjection to their husbands
restricted their participation in social, political, and economic life.2
Norton contends, however, that neighbors and government officials
scrutinized marital relations more zealously in New England than in
the Chesapeake.E' In the southern colonies, she argues, the skewed
gender ratio sowed seeds of a Lockean view of marriage as a
consensual or apolitical arrangement.2
The second and most interesting section of Founding Mothers and
Fathers presents Norton's findings about the existence of an informal
public in which women played influential roles as gossips and experts
on childbirth. 3 Women could achieve centrality in the lives of other
women, and even advise male officials, by becoming sexual experts.24
Gossip networks created and sustained by women transmitted
information about disordered families and illicit sexual activity and
were thus important sources for the courts.' However, while
reciprocity existed between "communities of men" and "communities
of women," Norton emphasizes that women spoke to men "from the
standpoint of importuning outsiders." 6 When the two communities
disagreed, masculine viewpoints usually prevailed. 7
a colony usually associated with Puritanism).
16. See id. at 64.
17. See id. at 74.
18. See, e.g., id. at 77-80 (discussing instances of wife-beating and other penalties for unruly
females).
19. See id. at 81-83.
20. See, e.g., id at 83-89 (stating that, although women sometimes entered into informal
commercial bargains, the men with whom they transacted business could renege at any time
because wives could not form legally valid contracts without powers of attorney, and that, even
then, their husbands might repudiate their actions).
21. See, e.g., id. at 48-49.
22. See id. at 5, 60-62. Although Locke initially argued that marriage was conjugal, rather
than political, he revised his position in his Second Treatise by describing a voluntary compact
between man and wife. See id. at 61.
23. See id at 183-277.
24. See, e.g., id. at 206, 225-27; see also infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
25. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 253-77.
26. Id. at 206.
27. See id at 239.
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Norton's nuanced discussion of the informal public in the second
section of her book blurs distinctions between New England and the
Chesapeake, and her emphasis on the power of "collective judgment,"
not determined solely by gender or social rank,' undercuts her
ambitious thesis about the creation of a "separate spheres" ideology.
In contrast, the final section of Founding Mothers and Fathers
reasserts the dichotomy of the Filmerian and proto-Lockean sys-
tems.29 Presenting analyses of sex crime prosecutions, colonial
politics, and the heresy trial of Anne Hutchinson, the last three
chapters suggest that, in New England, the family metaphor led to
vigorous attempts to cabin sexual intercourse within marriage, impose
patriarchal government by a distant king, and eradicate religious
heresies spread by women. Norton deftly weaves together these
disparate examples of gendered power in the state-showing, for
example, that Anne Hutchinson's ideas were alarming because of
their alleged similarity to those of the Familists, who reputedly
engaged in adulterous sex.30
Norton believes that, while the northern colonies struggled to
preserve the Filmerian hierarchy, the Chesapeake gradually aban-
doned it. In a chapter entitled "Marvelous Wickedness," she offers the
laxity of the southern courts toward sexual transgressions as an
example of this contrast.31 Norton describes varying patterns of
prosecution in the two regions. In her analysis, the Chesapeake's
tendency to wink at consensual sex acts that did not result in bastardy
and to punish women more severely than men in the rare cases that
reached the courts indicates that this "Lockean world was less
concerned about familial disorder., 32
B. Norton's Lockean World
Norton is at her best when she writes about Maryland and Virginia.
Historians have tilled northern court records to produce studies of
moral enforcement in individual counties, particularly in Mas-
sachusetts Bay.33 They have achieved an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of colonial due process,' the extent of privacy
28. 1d. at 241.
29. See id. at 281-399.
30. See id. at 390.
31. See id. at 321-58.
32. Id. at 347.
33. See generally DAVID T. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETrS:
ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692 (1979) (describing the operation of criminal justice at the county
level); ROGER THOMPSON, SEX IN MIDDLESEX: POPULAR MORES IN A MASSACHUSEM
COUNTY, 1649-1699 (1986) (analyzing sex crime prosecutions to show that young people in Mas-
sachusetts engaged in sexual experimentation and innuendo and were restrained from greater
transgressions by popular piety, rather than by patriarchal despotism).
34. See generally EDGAR J. MCMANUS, LAw AND LmERTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND:
1998]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 191
rights,35 and the nature of the crimes committed by and against
women.36 But relatively little has been written about law in the
Chesapeake in the seventeenth century. Except for a recent analysis
of the relationship between sexual regulation and racial definition in
Virginia,37 most studies of the Chesapeake lack both sensitivity to
the cultural construction of gender and the aid of computers in perfor-
ming statistical analysis.38 Thus Norton's discussion of the southern
colonies covers fresh and interesting territory.
Norton's painstaking study of the Maryland county court records
depicts a society in which tobacco planters like Edward Hudson and
Richard Holt shared a roof, a business, and-with a good deal more
acrimony-the sexual favors of Holt's wife.39 Norton has found other
examples of m~nages d trois in Maryland and has concluded that the
southern courts rarely pursued adultery prosecutions unless the
cuckolded husband initiated the action.' After Holt complained that
his wife and her lover intended to kill him, the court sentenced
Hudson to be whipped with thirty lashes and banished from the
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS, 1620-1692 (1993) (using printed sources to argue that,
while the Puritans grounded their laws in Scripture, their concern for due process anticipated
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
35. See generally DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1972)
(contending that Puritanism was not antithetical to personal privacy).
36. See, e.g., CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789, at 1-69, 157-284 (1995) (suggesting that Puritanism gave
women more avenues of participation and greater equality before the courts in 17th-century
Connecticut than did the social norms of the 18th century); N.E.H. HULL, FEMALE FELONS:
WOMEN AND SERIOUS CRIME IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETMS 142 (1987) (seeking to "partially
exonerate the Puritans and their descendants against the charge of sexism in the law and the
courts"). But see LYLE KOEHLER, A SEARCH FOR POWER THE "WEAKER SEX" IN SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1980) (positing a culture of patriarchy, sexual stereotyping,
and spousal abuse in terms that Hull and others contend are exaggerated).
37. See generally KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1996) (depicting colonial
Virginia as a patriarchal society and contending that, in the second half of the 17th century,
white Virginians increasingly used gendered discourses to subordinate blacks).
38. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975) (offering a political and social history of Virginia
centering on the way racial and class prejudice marred the colony's emerging vision of freedom).
Morgan gives the proscription of certain sexual behaviors only the briefest mention. See id. at
79-80; see also ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 252-92 (1930)
(presenting a more detailed analysis of the criminal law with a chapter on moral offenses).
39. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 344-46; see also JUDICIAL AND TESTAMENTARY BUSINESS
OF THE PROVINCIAL COURT, 1649/50-1657, at 64, 109-12 (10 Archives of Md., William Hand
Browne ed., Baltimore 1891) [hereinafter MARYLAND PROVINCIAL COURT RECORDS]
(documenting the Holt-Hudson case).
40. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 344; see also Mary Beth Norton, Gender, Crime, and Com-
munity in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 123,132 (James A. Henretta et al. eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Norton, Gender, Crime, and Community]. Perhaps because southern men wanted
to avoid the shame of admitting publicly that their wives had been unfaithful, only eleven
adultery prosecutions appear in the Maryland records for the seventeenth century. Moreover,
"no wife and just one husband formally accused a spouse of infidelity in a criminal trial" in
Maryland during this period. Norton, Gender, Crime, and Community, supra, at 130.
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county. Dorothy was ordered to endure fifty lashes, but the court later
commuted both whippings to fines. The court also prohibited Dorothy
from living as man and wife with Hudson, although he later fathered
two of her children.4
The more severe corporal punishment prescribed for Dorothy lends
support to Norton's assertion that "[a] clearly evident double standard
of sexual behavior guided the authorities in Virginia and
Maryland ... ,,4z In contrast to the more evenhanded punishments
for sexual crimes meted out by New England courts, southern women
felt the lash more often than did southern men.43 Norton attributes
this double standard to the Chesapeake's nascent Lockean world
view.' As we shall see, this theoretical explanation rests on shaky
ground.
According to Norton, the conviction of Dorothy Holt and Edward
Hudson was an exception to the rule in Maryland. The case of Mary
Taylor and George Catchmey, which was dismissed after the wronged
husband decided to keep quiet, had a more typical outcome.45
Indeed, the Maryland courts seem to have been more concerned with
discouraging false accusations than with punishing women or men who
engaged in extramarital sex. For example, when Bridgett Johnson
informed the court that she had twice caught John Clymer in flagrante
delicto with a married woman, the court concluded that her
"complaint is only in malice" and sentenced her to twenty lashes for
making claims she could not substantiate.' The number of sexual
offenses revealed in civil suits indicates the laxity of criminal
prosecution.47 According to Norton, southerners tended not to
inform against their neighbors unless they suffered slanderous insults
or wanted to collect money from men who got their servants
pregnant. 4
Unfortunately, Norton fails to clarify the relationship between the
Chesapeake's relatively laissez-faire attitude toward sex and the
41. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 345-46.
42. Id. at 346.
43. See id; see also Norton, Gender, Crime, and Community, supra note 40, at 141.
44. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 347.
45. See id. at 337,343-44. Norton notes, however, that the long-distance relationship between
Catchmey and Mary Taylor differed from the norm of two men sharing one woman under the
same roof. See id
46. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNTY COURTS OF KENT (1648-1676), TALBOT (1662-1674),
AND SOMERSET (1665-1668) COUNTIES 534 (54 Archives of Md., J. Hall Pleasants ed., 1937).
Norton discusses the Clymer case in a separate article. See Norton, Gender, Crim and
Community, supra note 40, at 131. She believes that Johnson was Clymer's spurned lover and
that she had been replaced by Elizabeth Madberie, the married woman in question. The
romantic jealousies implicated in the case cast doubt on Johnson's credibility. See id.
47. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 337.
48. See id.
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opportunities for southern women to wield informal authority. On the
one hand, she suggests that the Lockean world of Maryland and
Virginia was "built upon the relationships of the informal public" in
which women played vital roles as gossips and midwives.49 On the
other hand, she associates the southern colonies with a theory of
power "that resolved the ambiguities in women's status by rendering
females irrelevant outside the household."50 In the Filmerian system,
familial disorder had grave ramifications for the stability of the state.
Consequently, knowledge of reproductive matters and ability to
spread (or conceal) sexual information should have given northern
women a more influential voice in the regulation of morals than their
southern counterparts enjoyed.51 If sexual behavior attracted less
concern in the Chesapeake, the expertise of midwives and gossips
should have been correspondingly devalued by men. Moreover, the
logic of the family-state metaphor implies that New England widows
from socially prominent families could exercise a degree of political
power unthinkable in a Lockean world, where "the household power
structure was irrelevant to the polity." 2
Norton's discussion of the Chesapeake, however, often contradicts
her association of female authority with the paradoxes of New
England's hierarchical system. Her evidence indicates, against the
grain of her thesis, that southern women figured prominently as
informers or deponents for the state. For example, the midwife who
helped Mary Taylor deliver an illegitimate child by George Catchmey
reported her suspicions to the authorities after her efforts to blackmail
the adulterous couple failed.53 Rose Smith scolded Dorothy Holt for
breaking her marriage covenant and later deposed that Dorothy said
"she were as good kill ... [her husband] as live as [s]he did."'
In fact, many of Norton's best examples of women in public roles
come from the Chesapeake, rather than from New England. One
intriguing chapter follows the efforts of a group of Virginia women to
define the sexual identity of a neighbor who had male genitalia but
dressed as a woman and displayed skill in sewing.55 The female
"searchers" of Thomasine (or Thomas) Hall's body objected to
designating a person with a penis as female. The General Court's
compromise-ordering Hall to wear masculine clothes adorned with
49. Id. at 404.
50. Id at 10.
51. See, e.g., id. at 24 (noting that Massachusetts lawmakers recognized a quasi-public role
for women by including midwives in a list of public persons).
52. Id. at 291.
53. See id. at 230.
54. Id. at 345.
55. See id. at 183-202.
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an apron--demonstrated the informal influence of women upon the
outcome of sexual cases: "Hall's fate ... was determined as much by
a decision reached by ordinary women as... by a verdict formally
rendered by the elite men who served on the General Court. "56
Finally, it was in Maryland that the venerable spinster Margaret Brent
gained respect as a shrewd financial manager and, after being
designated Lord Baltimore's attorney, demanded a vote in the
Maryland Assembly.57
Norton falls back on her Filmerian shorthand to explain Mistress
Brent's public power. "[I]n a polity organized along familial lines,"
she writes, "some women-those who were high-ranking heads of
households-necessarily constituted exceptions to the general rule of
exclusion." 8 Yet the court's apathy toward the Catchmey adultery
case, which occurred in the same colony less than a decade after
Mistress Brent became His Lordship's attorney, is offered as evidence
that "the government of that Lockean world was less concerned about
familial disorder." 9 At this point, the reader may justifiably scratch
her head.
C. Misadventures in Political Philosophy
1. The Myth of the Filmerian System
The chief problem with Norton's book lies in its ambitious attempt
to document the decline of an all-encompassing mentalitg: the so-
called Filmerian system. Even assuming for the moment that jurors,
midwives, and other local folk pondered the nature of political power,
the premise that the early settlers patterned their lives after a
cohesive world picture-especially an extreme royalist one-does not
bear scrutiny. If the Filmerian polity is suspect, its erosion under the
demographic strains of the Chesapeake must also be reexamined.
Sir Robert Filmer wrote his treatise Patriarcha6 in 1640, but it was
not published for another forty years. When Patriarcha appeared in
print, the Whigs, who were anxious to keep the English crown from
passing to a Catholic, lambasted it as an apology for despotism. 6' As
David Wootton tells us, "Filmer's arguments were untypical of
royalists in general, both in his own day and in the 1680s when they
56. Id. at 197.
57. See id. at 281-82.
58. ld. at 291.
59. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
60. SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA, OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS (London,
Walter Davis 1680).
61. See David Wootton, Introduction to DIvINE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF POLITICAL WRITING IN STUART ENGLAND 22, 31 (David Wootton ed., 1986).
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became the focus of controversy."62 Filmer's emphasis on lineage
conflicted with the organization of contemporary English households,
each headed by a husband who left his parents and established an
independent life.' Although the family analogy upon which Norton
places such heavy emphasis recurs frequently in Stuart writings,' its
political meaning was less clear than she suggests. J.P. Sommerville
cautions that the "belief that royal and fatherly power were in some
respects similar did not imply any particular view about the origins
and nature of political society."'65
More importantly, to the extent that Filmer articulated a royalist
vision, his world view was antithetical to that of Puritan New
Englanders, who explicitly rejected the episcopal hierarchy in favor of
voluntary covenants and elected ministers. In the seventeenth century,
the patriarchal power of the king constituted a more intrusive force
in Norton's supposedly Lockean Virginia, which was governed by
royal appointees, than it did in New England, where the colonists
elected their own government officials.' At worst, Norton's odd
reluctance to explore Puritan beliefs leads her to characterize Oliver
Cromwell, the roundhead general who toppled Charles I, as
Maryland's "undisputed Filmerian father."'67
By conflating Puritanism and Filmerianism, Norton turns the clock
of historical research back to a time when the patriarchal nature of
the Puritan family was widely accepted.' As early as 1942, Edmund
S. Morgan challenged the image of the sexually repressed Puritan
patriarch, made infamous by Max Weber,69 by arguing that the
Puritans recognized sex as a human pleasure that strengthened the
marital bond.7' More recently, Roger Thompson, Margo Todd, and
others have undermined the association of Protestant, and particularly
Puritan, theology with "the total subordination of wives."'" In
62. Id. at 32.
63. See id.
64. See KEVIN SHARPE, A Commonwealth of Meanings, in POLITICS AND IDEAS IN EARLY
STUART ENGLAND: ESSAYS AND STUDIES 58-61 (1989) (citing examples of the family-state
analogy in family conduct manuals and other works). Like Norton, Sharpe reads too much
political meaning into conventional metaphors. His thesis that royalists and parliamentarians
"spoke a shared language" does not go far toward explaining why England erupted in civil war.
See id at 61.
65. J.P. SOMMERVILLE, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN STUART ENGLAND, 1603-1640, at 29
(1986).
66. See Edmund S. Morgan, Subject Women, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 31, 1996, at 66, 67
(criticizing Norton's association of the northern colonies with Filmerian political ideology).
67. NORTON, supra note 2, at 308.
68. See id. at 27-137.
69. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 158-59
(Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1920-21).
70. See Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritans and Sex, 25 NEW ENG. Q. 591, 593-94 (1942).
71. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800, at 138
(1979) (discussing the subordination of Puritan women). For a monograph that uses colonial
200
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contrast to Weber and Lawrence Stone, these revisionist writers
contend that the family ethic gave women authority over the spiritual
education of their children and made mutual affection, including
sexual love, the centerpiece of marriage.72
The prescriptions of family conduct manuals, from which many
accounts of Puritan patriarchy derive, were neither distinctively
Puritan nor reflective of behavior in actual families. When the
emotionally fragile London artisan Nehemiah Wallington crumbled
under the tragedy of his daughter's death, for example, his wife
reproved him for his excessive grief.73 Paul Seaver finds gentle irony
in Nehemiah's claim to be a Puritan patriarch:
In 1622 Nehemiah had made a New Year's resolution to carry
himself "as a head and governor" toward his wife, and Livewell
Rampaigne in his letter written to the Wallingtons in 1628 also
assumed conventionally that Grace was "the weaker vessel" in
need of Nehemiah's comfort... but these were cultural conven-
tions, not descriptions of social realities.74
Seventeenth-century Puritan fathers were thus less dour and
autocratic than Norton assumes. And, if the range of legal options and
public roles that women enjoyed in the seventeenth century shrank as
America moved into the eighteenth century, this contraction may
have been attributable to the decline of Puritanism, rather than to the
replacement of Filmer with Locke. As Cornelia Dayton's study of
female participation in the colonial Connecticut courts reveals, Puritan
legal innovations allowed women to appear as executors, witnesses,
and litigants and demanded roughly equal penalties for both sexes.75
Indeed, Dayton contends that "[i]f Puritan approaches to the law,
such as simplifying civil procedure, punishing men and women
American legal records to question the idea of Puritan patriarchy, see THOMPSON, supra note
33. Thompson shows that unmarried folk in Massachusetts Bay enjoyed a vibrant youth culture
that included premarital sex. See id. at 195. In contrast to both Lawrence Stone and Lyle
Koehler, he contends that married women did not feel oppressed; rather, they chose their
spouses and expected both emotional and sexual satisfaction from them. See id. at 193. But cf.
KOEHLER, supra note 36, at 136-60 (arguing that marriages in New England were fraught with
infidelity, dissatisfaction, and violence). A broader view, encompassing England and drawing on
Catholic humanist and Anglican writings, can be found in MARGO TODD, CHRISTIAN
HUMANISM AND THE PURITAN SOCIAL ORDER (1987). Todd argues that, whereas Lawrence
Stone and others exaggerate the patriarchal nature of 16th- and 17th-century families, other
scholars wrongly attribute the exaltation of the married state and the wife's role in family
discipline to the Puritans. Rather than being innovators of a reformist vision that gave women
greater equality in the family, the Puritans were "popularizers and practitioners of earlier
ideas-more properly associated with the Renaissance than the Reformation." Id. at 16.
72. See, e.g., TODD, supra note 71, at 105, 113.
73. See PAUL S. SEAVER, WALLINGTON'S WORLD: A PURrrAN ARTISAN IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY LONDON 87 (1985) (recounting Wallington's trials and tribulations from his extensive
manuscript diaries).
74. Id. at 86.
75. See DAYTON, supra note 36, at 30-33.
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equally, and receiving women's stories of abuse supportively, had
been retained as permanent fixtures of the evolving American legal
system, the result would have been a less patriarchal society in the
long run."76
In addition to miscasting Puritan New Englanders as inflexible
patriarchs and proponents of absolute monarchy, Norton relies on an
anachronistic equation of the Chesapeake with the ideas of John
Locke. Locke, whose Two Treatises of Government was not published
until 1690, had some precursors in the earlier part of the seventeenth
century.77 The early Stuart common lawyer John Selden advanced
the idea that, because civil society arose from a contract between
men, the monarch could only demand obedience as long as he upheld
his end of the bargain.78 But a third and more common view than
Selden's and Filmer's made the Crown accountable to an ancient
constitution without anticipating what would happen if the king
ignored the law.79 The revolt against Charles I in the 1640s turned
the world upside down in part because a political discourse had not
evolved to justify it: The Lockean social contract that helped English
people explain the ouster of James II in 1688 lay a half-century in the
future.8' Norton admits that, even in the latest years covered by her
book, southern colonists had not been exposed to Locke's ideas. This
admission forces her to argue that the southerners acted in accord
with principles that had not yet been articulated.
2. Cuckoldry and Popular Culture in England and America
Norton's effort to gild her thick description of colonial life with an
overlay of political theory underestimates the gap between elite
ideologies of governance and the less lofty concerns of ordinary
people. Although Norton devotes one-third of her book to the
importance of neighborliness and communal norms, she often
obscures the "bottom-up" perspective of the social historian. The
sexual laxity that she attributes to nascent Lockean ideas is more
properly located in the English popular tradition of wife sales8t and
76. Id. at 33.
77. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (London, Awnsham
Churchill 1690) (presenting Locke's views of the origins and ends of civil government and
explicitly rejecting Filmer's ideas).
78. See SOMMERVILLE, supra note 65, at 65.
79. See id. at 80 (suggesting that the differences between the theories of social contract and
the ancient constitution were not apparent until Parliament took arms against the King).
80. See idL
81. Wife sales were a form of extralegal popular divorce that preceded the colonization of
America. See SAMUEL PYEATT MENEFEE, WIVES FOR SALE: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF
BRrrIsH POPULAR DIVORCE 31 (1981) (noting that the practice of selling wives dated from the
11th century in the British Isles and was recorded in at least six English shires and in lowland
Scotland in the 16th and 17th centuries). Although Menefee's book largely addresses the 19th
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pregnant brides-informal sexual unions sealed by physical intimacy
or by the exchange of words and money.'
Two interrelated aspects of popular culture, both with deep English
roots, set bounds to the effectiveness of the written law. First, many
local communities used extralegal pressures to enforce their moral
values. Second, these values did not always correspond to those urged
by formal legal institutions and-particularly in the area of sexuality-
popular custom tolerated de facto unions that did not threaten the
stability of the community. Norton's discussion of the informal public
hints at the importance of grassroots influences. However, in focusing
on the Chesapeake's special role as a harbinger of Lockean ideas,
Norton ignores the extent to which southern tolerance of sexual
misconduct resonated with traditional English practices.
Mgnages d trois in Maryland seem less remarkable if we consider
that, when Thomas Heath came before a church court in Oxfordshire,
England in 1696, he was charged with "cohabiting in an unlawful
manner with the wife of George Fuller... since having bought her
of her husband."' The trading of women in the Chesapeake tapped
into the broader plebeian culture that New England theologian
Cotton Mather called "the vain conversation received by tradition
from our fathers." 4 As the Puritan regicides discovered when they
made adultery a capital offense in England in 1650,85 local customs
and loyalties constrained the godly reformation, much as they had
hampered the effectiveness of the prewar ecclesiastical courts.8 6
The presentment of moral offenders to the English church courts,
or "bawdy courts," began before the Reformation and continued
through the eighteenth century. The limits to ecclesiastical discipline
century, his characterization of wife sales as "a conservative and traditional social solution" that
"relieved stress on the social fabric with a minimal strain on the communal status quo" merits
attention. Id. at 210. But see MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN
ENGLAND, 1570-1640, at 207 n.47 (1987) (contending that, unlike other informal sexual
arrangements, wife sales were rare in England during the 16th and 17th centuries).
82. See RICHARD P. GILDRiE, THE PROFANE, THE CIVIL, & THE GODLY: THE REFOR-
MATION OF MANNERS IN ORTHODOX NEW ENGLAND, 1679-1749, at 96 (1994) (quoting the
popular adage, "[t]o eat, drink, and sleep together, these things seem to make a marriage");
INGRAM, supra note 81, at 125-291 (analyzing the relationship between law, sex, and marriage
in Elizabethan and early Stuart England); Keith Thomas, The Puritans and Adultery: The Act
of 1650 Reconsidered, in PURITANS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHRISTOPHER HILL 257, 260 & n.6 (Donald Pennington &
Keith Thomas eds., 1978) (citing INGRAM, supra note 81, for the statistic that about one-fifth of
all English brides were pregnant at their weddings).
83. THE CHURCHWARDENS' PRESENTMENTS IN THE OXFORDSHIRE PECULIARS OF
DORCHESTER, THAME, AND BANBURY 184 (10 Oxfordshire Record Soc'y, Sidney A. Peyton ed.,
1928) [hereinafter OXFORDSHIRE RECORDS].
84. GIuDRIE, supra note 82, at 45 (quoting CoTrON MATHER, ADVICE FROM THE WATCH
TOWER 27-28 (Boston, J. Allen 1713)).
85. See An Act for Suppressing the Detestable Sins of Incest, Adultery, and Fornication,
1650,2 ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM 387.
86. See Thomas, supra note 82, at 260-61.
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were much lamented by the Puritans at the time. For example, in
1583, English moralist Phillip Stubbs complained in The Anatomie of
Abuses:
The punishment appointed for whoredom now is so light that
they esteem not of it; they fear it not; they make but a jest of it.
For what great thing is it to go two or three days in a white sheet
before a congregation, and that sometimes not past an hour or
two in a day, having their usual garments underneath, as
commonly they have? And truly I cannot a little admire, nor yet
sufficiently deplore that wickedness of the ecclesiastical
magistrates in not punishing more grievously this horrible sin of
whoredom, for to go in a sheet with a white wand in their hands
is but a plain mocking of God and of his laws.'
Public humiliation imposed by the bawdy courts rarely took the form
of corporal punishment.88 But it was local custom, rather than elite
theory, that defined the limits of ecclesiastical discipline. As several
historians have noted, the clemency of the bawdy courts "derived not
from the explicit ideology-the canon law-but from the implicit
consent of the populace: mild punishments were all they were willing
to take for peccadilloes."89
When English people settled in the southern colonies, they brought
with them popular assumptions about the nature and limits of moral
policing. Maryland's code embodied New Testament discretion,
providing that adulterers and fornicators "shall be censured or
punished as the governor or council or other chief judge .. . think
fit."' And, in Virginia, the death penalty for adultery imposed by
Dale's Code never took root. Rather, until the mid-seventeenth
century, Virginia's adulterers and fornicators did the same mild public
penance as offenders who came before the English ecclesiastical
courts.9' For example, one Virginia couple in the 1640s was ordered
to "stand in the middle of the... church upon a stool in a white
sheet, and a white wand in their hands, all the time of divine service
and shall say after the ministers such words as he shall deliver unto
87. BEFORE THE BAWDY COURT. SELECTIONS FROM CHURCH COURT AND OTHER
RECORDS RELATING TO THE CORRECTION OF MORAL OFFENCES IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND,
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1300-1800, at 57 (Paul Hair ed., 1972) [hereinafter BEFORE THE BAWDY
COURT] (quoting PHILLIP STUBBS, THE ANATOMIE OF ABUSES (1583)).
88. See Paul Hair, Introduction to BEFORE THE BAWDY COURT, supra note 87, at 28.
89. Id.
90. PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, JANUARY
1637/38-SEPrEMBER 1664, at 286 (1 Archives of Md., William Hand Browne ed., Baltimore,
Maryland Historical Soc'y, 1891) (quoting An Act for Punishment of Certain Offenses as
Swearing, Cursing, Adultery, &c. (Apr. 1650)).
91. See BROWN, supra note 37, at 189-90.
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them before the congregation there present and also pay the charges
of the court."92
The criminal courts in the Chesapeake imposed harsher sentences
when the case involved an aggravating circumstance, such as marital
violence or the disobedience of a servant.9' However, longstanding
popular attitudes toward the cuckold sometimes deterred a man from
complaining of his wife's "lewd and idle life."94 In England, cuckolds
had long borne the brunt of ridicule, as this entry in the church court
records of West Ham, Essex in 1589 indicates:
[John Hopkinson] with others were in the company of a stranger
in the house of John Ward of Westham, a vittling house, in the
night time and, talking of Mr. Eborn, some said that he was
jealous over his wife. The said stranger said, if he knew where he
dwelt, he would nail a pair of horns at his door, and in further
talk this examinant said that Robert Dickins would give him a
pair of horns and so did, and he nailed them at the said Mr.
Eborn's door.9
While villagers nailed horns above a cuckold's door and carried him
through the streets astride a pole, accompanied by the "rough music"
of bells, pots and pans, and other raucous instruments, they often
allowed his wife's lover to go unscathed.96 The lover may have
escaped without punishment because his peers admired the picaresque
spirit of the sexually adventurous male romanticized in popular
ballads and chapbooks-cultural forms that ordinary Americans may
have encountered more often than the writings of elite political
thinkers.97
92. SCOTT, supra note 38, at 277 n.71.
93. In 1640, William Beard's wife escaped a public whipping in Virginia because she was
pregnant. However, her lover-who was also Beard's servant-was beaten to deter others from
the "grand enormity" of cuckolding their masters. MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL
COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, at 475 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
GENERAL COURT]. The following year, Elizabeth Storkey received twenty lashes "for her
offense in committing the act of fornication and adultery, as also for absenting herself and
running away from her master's service without his privity and consent." COUNTY COURT
RECORDS OF ACCOMACK-NORTHAMPTON, VIRGINIA, 1640-1645, at 117 (Susie M. Ames ed.,
1973) [hereinafter ACCOMACK RECORDS].
94. VIRGINIA GENERAL COURT, supra note 93, at 475.
95. BEFORE THE BAWDY COURT, supra note 87, at 137-38 (excerpting W. HALE HALE, A
SERIES OF PRECEDENTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CAUSES EXTENDING FROM THE
YEAR 1475 TO 1640; EXTRACTED FROM THE ACr-BOOKS OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE
DIOCESE OF LONDON 197 (1847)).
96. See Thomas, supra note 82, at 261, 263. But cf. INGRAM, supra note 81, at 165 (noting
that, although "the cuckolded husband was in some sense reprehensible," adulterers could also
be the targets of rough music).
97. See GILDRIE, supra note 82, at 90 (describing the "honor to be gained [within the
picaresque tradition] by abandoning wife and family for a more independent existence");
MARGARET SPUFFORD, SMALL BOOKS AND PLEASANT HISTORIES: POPULAR FICTION AND ITS
READERSHIP IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 72 (1981) (suggesting that servants and
apprentices, as well as more substantial yeomen and merchants, read the chapbooks in England).
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Imported to America, popular shaming rituals tapped into a culture
of festive misrule that the authorities, especially the Puritans, found
threatening.98 For example, Cotton Mather complained of the
mocking youths who gathered outside his lodgings: "On purpose to
insult piety, they will come under my window in the middle of the
night, and sing profane and filthy songs."99 Ridiculing the cuckold,
or the henpecked husband, served a punitive function."t° But
because popular moral policing embraced bawdiness and riot and
placed the blame on different actors (the cuckold, rather than the
adulterer), it coexisted uneasily with formal discipline. Indeed, the
festive element of "rough ridings" made it unclear what was being
celebrated: patriarchy or its inversion by strong-willed females.1"'
The tradition of public scorn toward the cuckold helps explain the
outcome of the Catchmey case in the Chesapeake, which Norton
discusses at length."' The adulterer George Catchmey warned
Robert Taylor that, if Taylor went to the authorities, the court would
record that he had been cuckolded. Unhappy with this prospect,
Taylor offered to raise the bastard child conceived by his wife and
Catchmey in exchange for some of Catchmey's tobacco. Because he
realized the weakness of his bargaining position, Taylor only
demanded two thousand pounds of tobacco and ultimately failed to
exact any compensation from Catchmey.'0 Although Norton
perceptively suggests that "each man decided that preserving his good
name was his most important goal,"' 4 she fails to accord sufficient
weight to the longstanding tradition behind the cuckold's fears.
Nailing horns to a man's door, literally or figuratively, amounted to
a communal judgment that he was unable to control his wife's sexual
habits. Like his initial impulse to get a warrant for Catchmey's arrest,
Taylor's failure to press charges arose from his concern that the
community would mock his troubles. 5 Rather than revealing a new
98. See, e.g., GELDRiE, supra note 82, at 2, 12 (stating that by the mid-17th century "a
coherent provincial variant of English popular culture had emerged" in the colonies and that the
Puritan Reformation of Manners targeted elements of this culture). But cf Martin Ingrain,
Ridings, Rough Music and the Reform of Popular Culture in Early Modern England, PAST &
PRESENT, Nov. 1984, at 79, 111 (contending that popular shaming rituals enjoyed strong links
to elite culture and, hence, were not as vigorously opposed as some scholars have indicated).
99. GILDRIE, supra note 82, at 129 (quoting 2 DIARY OF COTTON MATHER 217
(Massachusetts Historical Soc'y Collections, 7th ser., No. 8, Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1911)).
100. See Ingrain, supra note 98, at 92.
101. Id. at 97.
102. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 228-31, 261, 343-44.
103. See id. at 344.
104. Id.
105. Taylor was not hypersensitive in feeling that his neighbors took a keen interest in his
sexual troubles. One Virginia woman stood on a hogshead of tobacco and, by peeking through
a crack left by a loose board, saw "Mary West ... [lying] with her coats up above her middle
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distinction between public and private, the Catchmey case testifies to
the resilience of popular norms that made adultery deeply shameful
for the cuckold and indicates that men, as well as women, were the
objects of extralegal policing in the southern colonies.
II. NEW ENGLAND ADULTERY PROSECUTION IN CONTEXT
New England adultery cases provide an excellent vehicle for further
exploration of Norton's thesis. The definition of adultery as inter-
course with a married or espoused woman embodied an explicit
double standard, for a married man could not commit adultery by
sleeping with a single female.1 6 This asymmetry protected the
husband's sexual access to and control over his wife, and the severity
of the penalty--death by hanging-made the proscription seem all the
more draconian. But, if New England's adultery laws appear at first
glance to have bolstered the Filmerian hierarchy, a closer look reveals
that they were an unworkable innovation that failed as miserably in
the colonies as they did in England.
Keith Thomas has shown that the criminalization of extramarital
sex had deep English roots outside of Puritanism." 7 When the
church courts were abolished during the English Civil War, both
Puritans and royalists thought that penal laws must be enacted "for
punishing of adulteries and divers other offenses not punishable by
the common law."'" However, the Act of 1650, which prescribed
death for extramarital sex with a married woman, exceeded the level
of punishment to which English people were accustomed. Both the
resistance of local communities and the evidentiary constraints
embodied in the law itself insured that the Act remained "primarily
symbolic."1" If the failure of New Englanders to implement their
draconian punishments is analyzed in this context, the laxity of the
Chesapeake ceases to look like an ideological departure.
A. Religion, Politics, and the Adultery Laws
Although adultery prosecutions represent a relatively small part of
Norton's subject matter, they offer a window through which the forces
that shaped criminal justice in the colonies may be glimpsed. The
and Richard Jones with his breeches down lying upon her." But, with characteristic reluctance
to clinch an adultery charge, she testified, "what they did I know not." AccOMACK RECORDS,
supra note 93, at 290-91.
106. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 342. For a discussion of the property argument behind
the double standard, see Thomas, supra note 82, at 262. An unfaithful wife posed a threat to
lineage and, hence, to "whole system of property relations." Id.
107. See Thomas, supra note 82, at 265-78.
108. Id. at 275 (quoting a royalist petition).
109. Id. at 280.
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imposition of the death penalty for adultery was indeed debated at
the level of high politics in colonial America, but not for the reasons
that Norton suggests. Virginia made adultery a capital crime in 1610,
forty years before the Puritan regime took the same step in
England. 10 In the northern colonies of Massachusetts Bay,
Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, extramarital sex involving a
married or espoused woman was theoretically punishable by death at
least until the 1670s.11
The introduction of capital adultery laws in colonial America
represented an unwelcome innovation in two ways. First, the offense
was now based solely on the woman's marital status, whereas
Protestant moralists previously had defined adultery as sexual
infidelity by either spouse. Second, the capital laws imposed a much
harsher penalty than was prescribed in England before the Civil
War." 2 Attitudes toward the introduction of capital adultery laws
did not distinguish the Lockean south from the Filmerian north
however. The debate was much more complicated and scripturally
grounded than Norton allows. As I have argued above, Norton gives
too little attention to the Puritan values that influenced law and social
organization in colonies like New Haven.1 She fails to explore
adequately the extent to which New Englanders disagreed over the
use of Old Testament laws to govern their communities.1 14
Neither the northern nor the southern colonies uniformly adhered
to an Old Testament approach to adultery. Rhode Island's founding
precipitated controversy in part because its residents harbored
escaped adulterers and spoke out "against them which putteth people
to death for witches.""' The Deputy Governor of Maine also
110. See WILLIAM STRACHEY, FOR THE COLONY IN VIRGINEA BRITANNIA, LAWES DIVINE,
MORALL AND MARTIALL 12 (David H. Flaherty ed., University Press of Va. 1969) (1612)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA LAWS].
111. For a discussion of the early adultery laws and their subsequent modifications, see
KOE-ILER, supra note 36, at 147:
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth and New Haven Colonies early prescribed the death
penalty for adultery committed either with a betrothed or a married woman. Such laws
stayed on the books until the 1670s; then, Plymouth substituted one law which punished
offenders by two severe whippings and the wearing of an easily recognizable AD sewn on
the arm or back of one's garment. New Hampshire adopted the Plymouth statute in the
Cutt Code of 1680. Connecticut had, by 1673, liberalized its own adultery law; that colony
sentenced adulterers to be whipped, to wear halters around their necks, and to have an A
burned into their foreheads .... [In Massachusetts] [a]nother law in 1694 removed... [the
penalty of whipping and banishment, or death for those who refused to leave the colony]
and sentenced offenders to spend an hour on the gallows, receive up to forty lashes, and
wear a capital A two inches high.
I& (citations omitted).
112. See Thomas, supra note 82, at 257, 261-62, 265.
113. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
114. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 343 (mentioning that the sentiments of Maine's Deputy
Governor Thomas Gorges may have exemplified broader opposition to the death penalty).
115. 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN
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opposed the death penalty for adultery. Discussing the difference
between punishments in Maine and Massachusetts Bay, he wrote:
The governors of the Bay go according to the judicial laws of
Moses .... Tis very doubtful that we are on all points held to
them, as in the case of adultery. The law is established in the Bay
to be death, but methinks ... [the Jews] deserved a greater
punishment for it than we do because polygamy and bills of
divorce.., racticed upon light occasions were allowed among
them ....
As this quotation suggests, the controversy surrounding the direct
application of Old Testament proscriptions centered on the relevance
of religious precepts to civil government.
In England, the most powerful detractor of Mosaic law was not a
prescient social contractarian, but the king himself. James I argued
that the law of the Israelites was "only fit for that country, that
people, and time," and civil authorities could tailor it to meet local
needs.1 1 7 The coming of Christ abrogated Old Testament punish-
ments, as evidenced by Christ's mercy toward the adulteress. The
death penalty was thus a matter of discretion, to be used only in
extreme circumstances." 8
Rhode Island founder Roger Williams echoed the King's reasoning
when he lamented the decision to hang Thomas Newton, a well-liked
Connecticut tradesman, for adultery:
I grieve that my dear countrymen of Connecticut are so troubled
with that filthy devil of whorish practices and more yet that they
NEW ENGLAND 234-35 (John Russell Bartlett ed., Providence, A. Crawford Green & Brother
1856) (publishing a letter written by William Arnold of Pautuxit, opposing Rhode Island's
application for a charter). Rhode Island declared adultery to be "a vile affection, whereby men
do turn aside from the natural use of their own wives" but only prescribed such penalties as "the
wisdom of the state of England have... touching these transgressions." Id at 173 (recording
the adultery law promulgated at the General Court in May 1647). In 1647, adultery had not yet
become a capital crime in England.
116. THE LETTERS OF THOMAS GORGES, DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
MAINE, 1640-1643, at 36 (Robert E. Moody ed., 1978) [hereinafter LETTERS OF THOMAS
GORGES].
117. Thomas, supra note 82, at 269.
118. See id at 269-70. Despite James's attitude toward Mosaic Law, the first criminal code
promulgated in Virginia, with the King's blessing, theoretically made adultery a capital offense.
See VIRGINIA LAWS, supra note 110, at 5. There is no evidence that anyone ever died for
adultery in Virginia, although several men were executed for rape and sodomy. See SCOTT, supra
note 38, at 277. My own reading of the Virginia General Court records corroborates Scott's
findings about the lack of executions for adultery. In 1625, however, Richard Williams was
executed for committing sodomy, and Peter Marten was whipped, set in the pillory, and had an
ear cut off for suggesting that Williams, "an excellent mariner and skillful artist," had been
wrongfully put to death. VIRGINIA GENERAL COURT, supra note 93, at 93. The case of Symon
Hayle, who sexually assaulted four "maiden children" in 1627, also culminated in the death
penalty. Id. at 149. These executions demonstrate that, although the southern courts may have
had a more relaxed attitude toward adultery, they followed New England in severely punishing
rape and homosexual acts.
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are persuaded of such courses to cast him out. Adultery is a fire
which will root out, but the... [gentile nations] of the world will
never be proved capable of such laws and punishments as that
holy nation... [Israel], bred and fed with miraculous dispen-
sations,... [was] fit for. 19
The Newton case captures the difficulties that the early settlers faced
in adapting scriptural precepts to their need for an enforceable
criminal code. Aided by several members of the community, Newton
broke out of jail and fled-first to Rhode Island, then to the Dutch
colonies, and finally to Long Island." While Williams's sympathy
for Newton derived from theology, the townspeople who helped him
evade capture were arguably motivated by less ethereal impulses.
B. Limits to the Local Community's Willingness to Police Itself
In her path-breaking social history of criminal procedure in the
English shire of Sussex between 1592 and 1640, Cynthia Herrup states
that "[s]ocieties make laws, but individuals recreate those laws by
applying or ignoring them." '' Herrup observes two layers of law
enforcement in Sussex: the formal law derived from the Old Tes-
tament and the actual practices of the magistrates, constables, and
jurors who had to reach a consensus on the guilt of local people.122
In particular, she notes a profound reluctance to send defendants to
the gallows unless they exhibited a tendency toward evil, as opposed
to mere moral weakness." Evidence of mens rea came from much
broader sources than the law permits in modern times. A defendant's
gender, age, social status, relations with her neighbors, and past
criminal activity could all be taken into consideration. 2" Distinctions
between forgivable sins and outright evil, between insiders and
outsiders, demonstrated contemporary awareness that "the criminal
law as written worked as an ideal" to be selectively enforced."
Marginal figures like "strangers" or spinsters were more likely to be
convicted."2
Herrup's findings resonate deeply with the experience of moral
enforcement in colonial New England. Two vital observations about
the northern colonies erode the polarity between the Filmerian and
119. 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS 308-09 (Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988).
120. See William K. Holdsworth, Adultery or Witchcraft?: A New Note on an Old Case in
Connecticut, 48 NEW ENG. Q. 394, 402 (1975).
121. CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 25 (1987).
122. See id. at 193-94.
123. See id at 191.
124. See id. at 115, 118, 129.
125. Id at 193.
126. See id at 175-78.
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Lockean systems that Founding Mothers and Fathers seeks to
document. First, it was the gap between the ideal of formal, corn-
panionate marriages and the more varied reality that made moral
reformation seem necessary. New England families measured up to
the standard only slightly better than did their southern neighbors.
Second, the reluctance of New Englanders to act as informers,"r to
return convictions for capital offenses (especially when faced with
tough evidentiary problems),"2 or to impose the death penalty
suggests that their attitudes toward sexual misconduct did not differ
vastly from those in the Chesapeake.
Norton correctly suggests that New England's magistrates took a
hard line toward extramarital sex," just as the Puritan leaders of
the Commonwealth did after the execution of Charles I. But their
efforts to deter adultery by ratcheting up the punishment drastically
underestimated the extent to which law enforcement is defined from
below-not necessarily by the poor, but by the local community as
opposed to formal political leaders. Norton recognizes the importance
of the informal public in the colonies. But, because she never looks
to England, she fails to see that colonial resistance to sexual
regulation arose from the tradition of discretionary justice that existed
at least fifty years earlier in Sussex and other English counties. 3 °
Moral laxity was not a demographic accident unique to the
Chesapeake.
1. Disordered Families in New England
Norton documents ways in which dysfunctional northern families
seemed to threaten the political and religious order, but she neglects
a vital aspect of the disjunction between ideal and reality: the fact that
the formal law was too abstract and austere to resolve the ambiguous
cases that New Englanders confronted. In a society in which model
families were rarities, the recognition that humans were all sinners
affected the community's involvement at every stage of the criminal
process. In New England, as in the south, the problem of absentee
spouses and mismatched couples widened the gap between the way
the settlers lived and the ideal urged upon them by the magistracy.
Norton errs in suggesting that m~nages d trois arose from "the
sexual dynamics of life specific to the Chesapeake region." ''
Although men outnumbered women four-to-one in the southern
127. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 2, at 323-24.
130. See supra 121-126 and accompanying text.
131. NORTON, supra note 2, at 344.
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colonies, compared to a three-to-one ratio in New England during the
first generation, m~nages d trois existed in the north as late as the
1670s and 1680s. For instance, in Maine, the grounds for suspecting
Waymouth Bicketon's wife of adultery with a lodger arose from "their
familiarity in riding up and down together and of having... [their
beds] together in the same room."'' The Court threatened Bicketon
with a ten-pound fine if he did not order the lodger to leave the
house "within a fortnight's time.' ' 34 Norton contends that, with its
excess of male fishermen, Maine "resembled the Chesapeake rather
than its New England neighbors" and thus was "at least potentially a
Lockean society.' 135
Mgnages d trois had counterparts in other northern colonies as well.
For example, the records of Essex County, Massachusetts document
the relationship between eighty-year-old Alexander Gilligan, his wife
Elizabeth, and her quick-tempered lover, John Honiwell. 136 In 1685,
Elizabeth and Honiwell took a long journey to Maine, apparently with
her husband's consent, and cohabited for several weeks after they
reached their destination. They also seem to have shared a bed at
home in Marblehead, Massachusetts, where a neighbor testified that
"she had often seen Honiwell lying in Gilligan's bed when the latter
was lying at the bed's feet.' ' 137 The uneasy time-share that the men
arranged with regard to Elizabeth corroborates Lyle Koehler's
observation that "[t]he heavy social pressure on Puritan women to
marry at an early age... often led to bad marital choices.' ' 38 At his
advanced age, Alexander Gilligan may have recognized his sexual
shortcomings.
More often than in the Chesapeake, New England authorities took
steps to prohibit people from living in households like the Gilligans'.
Yet the failure of these measures reveals basic similarities between
ordinary people's role in law enforcement in the north and the south.
In 1647, the Massachusetts General Court noted with alarm how
132. See JOHN D'EMIIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 10 (1988).
133. 2 MAINE PROVINCE AND COURT RECORDS 290 (Charles Thorton Libby ed., 1931)
[hereinafter MAINE RECORDS].
134. Id
135. NORTON, supra note 2, at 16-17.
136. Honiwell-who faced charges of swearing, striking the constable, and "pursuing him
with a great pole," in addition to his adultery conviction--confessed to having a wife and six
children in England. 9 RECORDS AND Fn OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY
MASSACHUSETTS 240,537-38 (Mary G. Thresher ed., 1975) [hereinafter ESSEX RECORDS]. The
court ordered Elizabeth "to be severely whipped twenty stripes and to return to her husband
at Marblehead." Id at 535. John was secured "by chains that he ... [might] not escape" fol-
lowing his arrest, but his punishment remains unclear. Id. at 529.
137. Id at 536-38.
138. KOEHLER, supra note 36, at 146.
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many married people resided apart from their mates "by means
whereof they live under great temptations, and some of them commit
lewdness and filthiness amongst us, and others make love to women
and attempt marriage and have attained it .... ,,139 The court
ordered the couples to "repair to their relations by the first oppor-
tunity of shipping," unless they were "here in a transient way only for
traffic or merchandise" or were "come over to make way for their
families.""4 However, the 1647 order did not solve the problem in
Massachusetts.""
Absentee spouses led to informal sexual relations and bastard
children in the other northern colonies as well. For example, when
Mary Attkinson of Plymouth became pregnant after her spouse
abandoned her,42 the ambiguity of her marital status justified
reducing her count of conviction. The grand jury indicted Attkinson
and her paramour, John Bucke, and the petit jury convicted them of
adultery. But the court reduced the charge to fornication because it
was "uncertain whether the husband.. . is or was living at the
time."'' 43 The court subsequently granted Attkinson a divorce on the
grounds that her husband had "absented himself from her the full
term of seven years and more, neither coming at her nor providing for
her.. . ."" Flexibility and mercy must have been the only palatable
solution, considering the abandoned wife's predicament and her
relatively high status in the community.45
2. Two Eyewitnesses or the Equivalent Thereunto
Evidentiary issues troubled colonial juries and meant that, in
practice, defendants usually were convicted of lesser offenses than
adultery. In New England, the slim chance that the requisite two
eyewitnesses would observe a sex act made the capital offense almost
impossible to prove -a factor that did more to equalize northern
and southern laws than Norton allows. The English faced even greater
evidentiary hurdles because husbands, wives, and lovers could not
139. 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND 211-12 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETrs RECORDS].
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., infra notes 149-152, 155-157, 165-178 and accompanying text.
142. See 5 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH N NEW ENGLAND 82 (Nathaniel
B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1855) [hereinafter PLYMOUTH RECORDS].
143. Id.
144. Id at 159.
145. She came from a family wealthy enough to pay ten pounds sterling to keep her from
the whipping post. See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
146. See THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WIrrNRoP, 1630-1649, at 610 (Richard S. Dunn et al. eds.,
1996) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP] (discussing evidentiary requirements for an
adultery conviction in Massachusetts in the 1640s).
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testify against each other. Indeed, Thomas indicates that evidentiary
requirements alone may have dictated the failure of the 1650 Act, and
a seventeenth-century writer believed that the English law was "so
penned that few or none will ever be convicted upon it."' 47
Thomas's theory merits consideration in the American context, for it
implies that the reluctance of New Englanders to convict their
neighbors was reinforced, rather than opposed, by the internal limits
of the law.
As Norton indicates, the courts in New England found most
adultery defendants guilty of lesser offenses like "shameful and
unchast[e] behavior," instead of the capital crime."4 One notable
case that Norton does not mention highlights communal division over
a jury's refusal to deliver a capital conviction. When Ensign Hudson
returned to England to fight for Parliament, a married friend whose
spouse was also abroad "grew over familiar" with Hudson's wife. 49
After being examined by the magistrate, the suspected adulterer
confessed that he had lain in bed with the young woman, "but both
denied any carnal knowledge."'" The jury found the couple guilty
of "adulterous behavior" rather than returning a capital convic-
tion.' John Winthrop wrote of the controversy that ensued:
[The jury's refusal to convict for adultery] was much against the
minds of many, both of the magistrates and elders, who judged
them worthy of death; but the jury attending what was spoken by
others of the magistrates, 1. that seeing the main evidence against
them was their own confession of being in bed together, their
whole confession must be taken, and not a part of it; 2. the law
requires two witnesses, but here was no witness at all, for
although circumstances may amount to a testimony against the
person, where the fact [of a sexual act] is evident, yet it is
otherwise where no fact is apparent; 3. all that the evidence could
evince was but suspicion of adultery, but neither God's law nor
ours, doth make suspicion of adultery (though never so strong)
to be death. 152
147. Thomas, supra note 82, at 279 (quoting MERCURIUS PRAGMATICUS, May 14-21, 1650).
148. NORTON, supra note 2, at 343. The records abound with cases that corroborate Norton's
point. For example, in 1676, Sarah Bucknam of Boston and Peter Cole of Charlestown were
indicted for adultery but were found "not guilty according to the indictment but guilty of
unlawful and uncivil accompanying... being in bed together." 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS BAY 73-74 (John Noble ed., 1901)
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF AssISTANTS].
149. JOURNAL OF JOHN WNTHROP, supra note 146, at 609.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 609-10.
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Norton finds such avoidance of capital sentences disingenuous,
noting that some adulterous couples were acquitted, despite such
"seemingly irrefutable evidence" as "the birth of a child the woman's
husband could not have fathered."' S3 However, while some courts
may have used evidentiary rules as a smoke screen, many cases reveal
genuine confusion about how much evidence was needed for an
adultery conviction. For example, the following special verdict was
delivered in a Massachusetts case: "If by law Bethjah Bullojne lying
in bed with Peter Turpin be adultery, we find her guilty. If by law
Bethjah Bullojne lying in bed with Peter Thrpin be not adultery, we
find her not guilty."'"
The existence of an illegitimate child could be introduced as
evidence against adultery suspects, but paternity was hard to prove,
and the courts would not always accept a bastard in place of
eyewitness testimony. In 1656, the Massachusetts General Court
wrestled with a thorny problem certified to it by the Court of
Assistants.1 55 A married woman, residing with her husband in the
house of another man, entered into an affair with the landlord,
causing her angry husband to depart. Shortly after the husband
returned, the woman delivered "a strong, lively, perfect child ... four
weeks and five days short of forty weeks.' 1 6 The wife's lover, who
was accused of adultery, posted bail and ran away, leaving the
prosecution with nothing but the bastard child as evidence of adultery.
The General Court answered the question certified to it-"whether
here be two witnesses, or that which is equivalent to it"-in the
negative.157
Norton provides ample evidence of the courts' reluctance to order
the death penalty, even for repeat offenders.'58 But her failure to
examine the reasons for imposing nearly insuperable evidentiary
requirements leaves the lawmakers' motivation a mystery. If adultery
posed such a dire threat to the social hierarchy, why did the defenders
and beneficiaries of that hierarchy insure that their legal code
remained primarily symbolic? Herrup's insight about the religious
distinction between sin, which is universal and forgivable, and evil,
153. NORTON, supra note 2, at 343.
154. 3 MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 148, at 191-92.
155. See 4 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 139, at 213.
156. Id.
157. Id. In some cases, the courts got around evidentiary constraints by substituting the
defendant's subsequent bad actions for an eyewitness. For example, Thomas Newton's attempts
to run away counted as an "eyewitness," despite the fact that no one had actually seen him and
his lover having sex. See Holdsworth, supra note 120, at 399 n.18.
158. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 343.
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which is not, goes further toward explaining the restraints built into
the adultery laws than the rigid Filmerian model does. 59
3. Private Matters
Evidentiary problems could be both a valid legal obstacle and a
convenient cover for reluctance to prosecute "private" matters.
Throughout her book, Norton skillfully navigates the varied meanings
of "private" in the seventeenth century. She shows that the word
meant "secret," as well as "personal" or "not public," and she
describes dissension over the types of activities that could be
considered "private."'(' In her excellent chapter on the Antinomian
Controversy, for example, she suggests that the regularity of Anne
Hutchinson's religious meetings and the large number of women in
attendance made the meetings seem threateningly "public" to male
authorities in Massachusetts Bay.61 Hutchinson presented a com-
peting view of the gatherings as "private" occurrences in her own
home.1 62 Moreover, Hutchinson argued that her statements to
certain clergymen should be kept confidential, for they had been
made during a "private conference."''
Did similar disagreements exist with regard to the privacy of sexual
matters? Although Norton argues that New England courts
scrutinized sexuality more carefully than did their southern counter-
parts, she underestimates the efforts of some northerners to shield the
bedroom from the public eye. Furthermore, her description of such
events in the Chesapeake as the invasive body search of Thomasine
Hall undermines her contention that southerners cared less about
sexual policing."
The Greenland-Rolfe case in Massachusetts, which Norton fails to
discuss, illuminates the disagreement in the northern colonies over the
duty to report suspected adultery. In 1663, the hard-drinking doctor
Henry Greenland, whose wife was still in England, tried to start a
sexual relationship with Mary Rolfe in her husband's absence.
Greenland tried "with many arguments [to entice] her to the act of
uncleanness," grabbed her by the apron, and, after she let him into
her home one night, climbed naked into her bed while she stood
159. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
160. See, &g., NORTON, supra note 2, at 20-24 (offering some preliminary definitions of
"public" and "private"); id. at 191 (discussing the lack of privacy available to Thomasine Hall
in the proceedings to determine her gender); id. at 359-99 (presenting a detailed analysis of
tension over the meanings of "public" and "private" in the trial of Anne Hutchinson).
161. See iU at 380-81.
162. See id at 379.
163. Id. at 383.
164. See id at 404.
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tending the fire." Mary protested that these incidents were noncon-
sensual. In her view, John Emery, the neighbor with whom Greenland
lodged, had shirked his duty to act as her "father" until her husband
returned."6
The conflicting testimony of the community did not result in a clear
verdict for Mary. Although the jury found Greenland guilty of
soliciting Mary to adultery and sentenced him to be whipped or to
pay a fine of thirty pounds, Mary was presented for conduct indicating
her complicity.67 The court found that she had told "a scandalous
lie that John Emery ... brought the doctor to her house unknown to
her, when she herself came and invited them."' 8 Moreover, several
people deposed that Mary continued to have supper with the Emerys
after she accused Greenland, and that "she was so loving that she and
Mr. Greenland ate out of one dish and with one spoon."'69
The Rolfe case undermines the idea that ordinary New Englanders
were always zealous watchdogs of their neighbors' foibles. As a grand
juror, John Emery had a duty to ferret out wrongdoing, as well as to
indict suspects.7 ° Yet, when Mary's mother asked Emery's advice
about the troubles with Doctor Greenland, "he advised [her] to keep
it close and warranted there should be no more harm done" because
he planned to "lock... [Greenland] up at night and lock the liquors
from him ... ."" The worried woman asked him "how he could
dispense with his oath being a grandjuryman... [and he] answered,
'That I can do very well. I see no harm in none of them.""'  The
willingness of a grand juror to turn a blind eye to sexual misconduct
corroborates the concerns of the prominent Puritan Cotton Mather,
who lamented:
What can the magistrates do... if there be no in-
formers? ... When our grand juries are inquiring after delin-
quents, it would not be amiss for those good men to make this
inquiry: whether they do not sometimes, through inadvertency, let
165. 3 ESSEx RECORDS, supra note 136, at 52; see also id. at 53-54.
166. Id. at 48.
167. See id at 47, 65.
168. Id. at 65.
169. Id. at 50. Mary had also charged another man, Richard Cording, with trying to seduce
her and was later observed "riding with... [him] at unseasonable times in the night." Id. at 66.
Her habit of entertaining noisy guests in her home after dark compounded her credibility
problems. Three local women testified that, while drinking liquor, Mary declared that she
wanted to save part of the bottle "until Mr. Greenland came home for.., he seemed to be a
pretty man and she desired to be acquainted with him." Id. at 51.
170. See FLAHERTY, supra note 35, at 201. Flaherty notes, however, that knowledge based
on intimate relationships could be privileged and that "jurors were not bound to reveal
[s]ecrets." Id. at 202.
171. 3 ESSEx RECORDS, supra note 136, at 52.
172. Id. at 52-53.
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some notorious violations of the laws pass without any
presentment. Good Sirs, examine yourselves. 3
Although at least one of Mary's neighbors believed that "[t]hese
things should not be kept private" for fear of provoking God, 74
others shared the grand juror's reluctance to get involved. Henri
Lesenby heard a shriek as he passed Mary's house late at night and
found Greenland in her bedroom when he investigated. Yet, he
decided that "it was not best to make an uproar but to let him go
away in a private manner."'75 David Flaherty notes that both
Puritan moralists and popular adages censured gossips for poking into
other people's affairs.7 6 At the level of popular wisdom, Lesenby's
failure to accost the influential doctor followed the proverb: "He that
prieth into every cloud may be struck by a thunderbolt."'" The case
only reached the courts because Mary's mother "[r]evealed all to a
wise man in the town, desiring his advice."' 78 It is not clear whether
Mary's mother intended for the affair to reach the courts, or whether
the wise man (like the clergy in the Antinomian Controversy)
breached a private confidence.
Regardless of who initiated the court's involvement, the Greenland-
Rolfe case shows that New Englanders disagreed over the boundaries
between public disorder and private sexual tension. One villager's fear
that God would punish the community for the sins of Doctor
Greenland resonates with the Puritan belief in Providential acts.
However, the desire to keep the incident private represents an equally
strong current in the court records. The grand juror's laxity in carrying
out his duty as an informant (as well as the conflicting privilege that
theoretically attached to private confessions) indicates that "[a]ny
automatic association of Puritanism with the denial of privacy is a
reflection of an outdated and monolithic interpretation."' 79
173. COTrON MATHER, The Reprover Doing His Duty, in A FAITHFUL MONITOR 50-51
(Boston, Timothy Green 1704).
174. 3 ESSEX RECORDS, supra note 136, at 52.
175. Id.
176. See FLAHERTY, supra note 35, at 96.
177. Id at 96 (quoting JOHN CLARKE, PAROEMIOLOGIA ANGLO-LATINA IN USUM
SCHOLARUM CONCINNATA; OR, PROVERBS ENGLISH AND LATINE 31 (London, Felix Kyngston
1639)).
178. 3 ESSEx RECORDS, supra note 136, at 53. Mary may have been deterred from
complaining herself by the fear that she would be prosecuted for the offense of "adulterous
carriages," or perhaps even adultery, if she could not prove that she had resisted Greenland's
overtures. Indeed, one neighbor "asked why goody Rolfe did not cry out" and was only
"persuaded [that] goody Rolfe... [was] an honest woman" after being assured that she had
uttered a scream. Id. at 54. Cornelia Dayton believes that the courts were less likely to question
a female rape victim's credibility in the 17th century than in the 18th century. See DAYTON,
supra note 36, at 231-84. The Rolfe case, however, provides some evidence to the contrary.
179. FLAHERTY, supra note 35, at 14.
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C Insiders and Outsiders: The Selective Enforcement of the
Adultery Laws
The ambiguous relationship between Mary Rolfe and Doctor
Greenland provided an excuse for not bringing the full force of the
law against "a stranger and a great man," of whom Mary supposedly
said:
He is in credit in the town; some take him to be godly and say he
hath grace in his face .... It is said he is in credit with those that
are in authority in the country: It is said the governor sent him
a letter counting it a mercy such an instrument was in the
country, and what shall a poor young woman as I do in such a
case, my husband being not at home?"8
Mary's friend Betty Webster thought that if she and Mary had let the
drunken doctor beat down the door, he would have been hanged.'
But the persistent failure of the northern courts to impose severe
sentences on high-status sexual offenders suggests that she was wrong.
In England, less than a half dozen people died for the crime of
adultery during the Interregnum; juries simply refused to convict the
accused unless the alleged sex act involved an unpopular individual
like a Catholic priest."8 In the northern colonies, there were only
three documented executions."8 The few who suffered the death
penalty for sexual crimes (including sodomy, rape, and bestiality, as
well as adultery) tended to be marginal figures-religious malcontents,
homosexuals, Native Americans, and blacks. Both Norton and
Cornelia Dayton emphasize that there was a single standard of
punishment for men and women in New England during the
seventeenth century.8" But while northern men were relieved of
180. 3 ESSEX RECORDS, supra note 136, at 52.
181. See iii at 53.
182. See F.A. INDERWICK, THE INTERREGNUM (A.D. 1648-1660): STUDIES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, LEGISLATIVE, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL 33-39 (London, Sampson Low, Marston,
Searle & Rivington 1891) (confirming at least three English adultery executions pursuant to the
Act of 1650 at Taunton, Chester, and Exeter, but noting that juries rarely convicted defendants
of adultery, even where the evidence was conclusive). Inderwick believes that a pregnant woman
sentenced to hang in Middlesex in 1652 was eventually reprieved. See id. at 37-38. Other sources
indicate that Inderwick overlooked a few convictions. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 82, at 258
n.4 (noting an additional manuscript source that discusses an Essex woman condemned to death
for adultery but later shown mercy).
183. See JOURNAL OF JOHN wINTiRop, supra note 146, at 500-02 (discussing the execution
of James Britton and Mary Latham for adultery); see also infra notes 220-232 and accompanying
text. For a reference to the execution of Thomas Newton's lover, see 1 ANCIENT TOWN
RECORDS: NEW HAVEN 30-32 (Franklin A. Dexter ed., 1917) (presumably referring to Elizabeth
Johnson, who was executed in nearby Connecticut colony); see also infra notes 217-218 and
accompanying text.
184. See DAYTON, supra note 36, at 164-72; NORTON, supra note 2, at 74-75. Both authors
recognize that the legal definition of adultery itself embodied a double standard.
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responsibility for sexual transgressions less often than were those in
the south, the outcome of adultery cases in both regions depended on
criteria apart from gender that historians have not analyzed in
adequate detail.
This section discusses an area left vague in Norton's book: the role
of status and reputation in determining the vulnerability of suspects
to prosecution for sexual offenses. I conclude that factors such as
wealth, race, economic dependence, and religious or political
dissidence affected every stage of the criminal process from arrest to
sentencing.
1. Wealth and Influence
In New England, money and influence could almost always buy
leniency. The lecherous Maine preacher George Burdett was found
guilty on three counts: "one for.., a common breach [of] the peace,
another for adultery, a [third] for.., often soliciting [three] sexy
women to his incontinent practice and persuading [them] by scripture
to satisfy his insatiable lust."'" Although Burdett paid a fine for
each count, the deputy governor felt that this penalty was "many
degrees beneath the quality of his offenses.., but he is strongly
upheld by some and maintained by others to the grief of good
people.' 186
Money also allowed women to escape corporal punishment. The
contrast between the fate of Mary Attkinson of Plymouth and that of
Ensign Hudson's wife in Massachusetts Bay is particularly instructive.
The existence of a bastard child constituted strong evidence that Mary
had consummated her affair with John Bucke; however, her father
paid ten pounds sterling to spare her from being publicly stripped to
the waist and whipped." 7 Even if motivated by a desire to preserve
the family reputation, the willingness of Mary's father to come to her
aid reveals deep flaws in Norton's image of "the Filmerian father who
coldheartedly arranged for the death or disinheritance of disobedient
offspring. "'8
In contrast to Mary Attkinson, the Hudson woman escaped an
adultery conviction due to the lack of eyewitnesses but nevertheless
came under the lash. As Winthrop recalled in his Journal:
The husband.., was so confident of her innocency in point of
adultery, as he would have paid the 20 pounds rather than she
should have been whipped; but their estate being but mean, she
185. LETTERS OF THOMAS GORGES, supra note 116, at 36.
186. Id.
187. See 5 PLYMOUTH RECORDS, supra note 142, at 82.
188. NORTON, supra note 2, at 404.
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chose rather to submit to the rest of her punishment, than that
her husband should suffer so much for her folly.'89
Winthrop gave the Hudson story the moralistic closure of a Sunday
school lesson; taken together, however, the two cases reveal a basic
class distinction built into the administration of punishment. Although
juries might treat defendants equally with regard to their convictions
(Attkinson and Hudson were both found guilty of lesser crimes than
adultery), status and wealth made a big difference at the sentencing
stage. Poorer people could not atone quietly for their extramarital
exploits because their inability to pay steep fines ensured that their
punishment would draw a curious crowd.
2. Race
Race was another factor that affected the calculus of guilt and
punishment. Indeed, adultery first appeared as a capital offense in
Massachusetts Bay in 1631 after John Dawe was convicted of
"enticing an Indian woman to lie with him."'" The importance of
race in the enforcement of sexual morality remains unclear, however,
and Norton's silence on the subject does not further our understan-
ding.191
In their study of miscegenation laws in antebellum Virginia, Leon
Higginbotham and Barbara Kopytoff conclude that "[i]n Virginia
before the 1660s, there was no unambiguous legal statement against
interracial sex per se, as distinguished from... [non-marital] sex in
general."'" At first glance, nonwhites (usually Native Americans)
in New England also appear to have received equal treatment. For
example, in 1674, a jury of "six English and six Indians" found Tom
Indian guilty of "a rape on the body of Sarah the wife of John
Jempson an Indian" and sentenced him to "hang til he be dead."''
The fact that a jury partially composed of nonwhites tried Tom Indian
reveals a basic concern for procedural due process.
However, whites also tended to ascribe weaker morals to Native
Americans-a form of prejudice that cut two ways. On the one hand,
juries were less likely to attribute a criminal mental state to
nonwhites. For example, a Native American named Tmsin seems to
have received a milder punishment than the white woman with whom
189. JOURNAL OF JOHN wINTHROP, supra note 146, at 610.
190. 1 MASSACHUSETrS RECORDS, supra note 139, at 91.
191. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 15 (stating that, due to the relative dearth of cases invol-
ving nonwhites, "this study can say less than I would have preferred about issues of race and
ethnicity during the early years of colonization").
192. A. Leon Higginbotham & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the
Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1988 (1989).
193. 1 MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 148, at 122.
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he committed adultery because the woman allured and enticed
him." Similarly, in a Plymouth rape case, the defendant got a
whipping rather than a death sentence, "considering he was but an
Indian, and therefore in an incapacity to know the horribleness of...
[his] act."' 95 Whites considered nonwhites to be ignorant heathens,
not hardened evildoers, and the punishments prescribed for nonwhite
defendants were correspondingly less severe.
On the other hand, the perceived cultural "otherness" of Native
Americans and blacks may have made them more susceptible to
prosecution for rape (a crime that contemporaries regarded as more
serious than adultery)."9 Barbara Lindemann argues that the rape
cases that attracted the most attention involved male defendants of a
different race or a lower social status than their victims. Indeed,
where there was ambiguity, juries often refused to accept that a white
woman would consent to sex with a nonwhite male.1" Lindemann
cites the eighteenth-century case of a Native American laborer
accused of attempting to rape his white neighbor. The alleged victim
offered wildly inconsistent accounts of the incident, blaming first the
devil and then a thief for the assault before settling on the Native
American, Simon Tripp. Four witnesses testified that Tripp was "as
good credit as she that talk of him," but the jury nevertheless declined
to acquit him. 98 The line between adultery and rape was thus
redrawn in favor of the higher-status white woman.
The Tripp case may have had seventeenth-century counterparts in
both New England and the Chesapeake. In Virginia, surviving
depositions tell a conflicting story about the relationship between
Katherine Watkins, a married white woman, and a mulatto slave
named John Long in 1681. After she discovered her pregnancy,
Katherine decided to accuse Long of binding her mouth with a
handkerchief and forcibly raping her. One deponent corroborated
Katherine's version of the incident, testifying that her mouth was
bloodied and swollen, but several other witnesses asserted that
Katherine had "put her hand in... [Long's] codpiece," kissed him,
and led him into a secluded room."9 The disposition of the case has
194. See 1 PLYMOUTH RECORDS, supra note 142, at 132.
195. 6 id. at 98.
196. See, e.g., LETrERS OF THOMAS GORGES, supra note 116, at 36-37. Although Gorges
found the death penalty too draconian a punishment for adultery, he expressed surprise that a
nineteen-year-old who raped a child was not put to death. Id. at 37.
197. See Barbara S. Lindemann, "To Ravish and Carnally Know": Rape in Eighteenth
Century Massachusetts, 10 SIGNS 63, 79-80 (1984); see also BROWN, supra note 37, at 209-10
(suggesting that "presumptions of white female resistance" increased the chances of black men
being convicted in interracial rape cases).
198. Lindemann, supra note 197, at 80.
199. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 192, at 2028 n.211.
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not survived, but its ambiguity remains troubling because in six
Virginia rape cases prior to 1774 involving black defendants, juries
found three blacks guilty of rape and two guilty of attempted rape or
assault.2° In contrast, three out of five white defendants were found
innocent or were not indicted.2°t Similarly high conviction rates for
nonwhites appear in the records of the Massachusetts Court of
Assistants between 1630 and 1692. In the cases I located, not a single
nonwhite was ever acquitted. Of the five rapists sentenced to death
in Massachusetts Bay, though, only two were clearly nonwhites.'
Furthermore, all of the rape cases that resulted in death or banish-
ment for nonwhites involved an aggravating factor that sometimes
even led to the death penalty for white men: The victim was either a
child or a married woman.'
The evidence of racial prejudice is thus too flimsy to support the
argument that seventeenth-century Americans singled out Native
Americans and blacks for hanging. It does suggest that race figured
in the jury's willingness to convict. And, because nonwhites could
seldom pay fines to avoid whipping, they often fell into the category
of defendants receiving harsher punishments.
3. Bastard-bearers and Other Troublemakers
A less quantifiable form of status than wealth or race-the good
will of one's neighbors-spared almost all New England adultery
defendants from the death penalty. Not surprisingly, loyalty to well-
reputed local people had long influenced the outcome of church and
secular court cases in England. Under the ecclesiastical system, a
defendant who denied her charge had to undergo compurgation,
which entailed appearing with two to six neighbors who would testify
to her innocence.'
200. See id. at 2009-10. The sixth black defendant was never apprehended. See also BROWN,
supra note 37, at 209 (citing similar statistics for Virginia in the late 17th century). Brown notes
that, of 18 interracial rape cases in Virginia courts between 1670 and 1767, only 2 were
dismissed, and that 12 of 19 black defendants were executed for rape. See id.
201. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 192, at 2009-10.
202. See 1 MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 148, at 22 (recording that
a Native American was sentenced to death for raping a married Native American woman); id.
at 74 (documenting a capital sentence for a black slave for raping his master's daughter, a three-
year-old child). I am assuming, perhaps erroneously, that a defendant was white if his race does
not appear in the record. Nonwhites were almost invariably identified as being "Indian,"
"African," or "Negro."
203. In addition to the two cases cited, supra note 202, see also 3 MASSACHUSETTS COURT
OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 148, at 216 (noting that for raping a nine-year-old Native American
girl, a Native American defendant was sold into slavery in the Caribbean and threatened with
death if he returned); 3 id. at 199-200 (noting that a white defendant was sentenced to death for
raping an eight-year-old girl); and 1 id. at 50 (documenting the hanging of a presumably white
defendant for raping a married woman).
204. See INGRAM, supra note 81, at 51-52, 331-34.
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In 1611, two churchwardens from Banbury Peculiar in Oxfordshire
asked the bishop to "deal well with Zacharias Richardson," who had
been presented for fornication with Anne Harise. Richardson was
"well thought of with us," whereas the woman (who had left the
community) had been "ever reputed a bad member."'  More than
a century later, twenty-eight people from Thame made a similar plea,
claiming that Mary Towsen "in hopes ... to gain [Thomas West] for
her husband" falsely accused him of impregnating her.2 6 Mary "had
been a loose and scandalous person before and since she came to live
at Thame."'  In contrast, West "hath lived in service in one place
for twenty years and upwards" and was "never suspected of any
unchastity or dishonesty."' Those New Englanders executed as
punishment for their sexual behavior lacked the good esteem that
Zacharias Richardson and Thomas West enjoyed.
Married women who gave birth to bastards caused strife in England
and America not because they subverted the so-called Filmerian
hierarchy, but because either the wronged husband or the locality had
to bear the financial burden if the biological father fled or could not
be identified.2' ° According to Norton, the high percentage of single
servant women in the Chesapeake led to a much higher prosecution
rate for bastardy than in New England-half of all sex-related
prosecutions in the south, compared with one-tenth of northern
prosecutions. 210 However, New England courts often collapsed
bastardy into fornication or adultery charges with the child serving as
evidence of an illicit sex act."' It would thus be a mistake to
suppose that New Englanders did not worry as much about the
economic ramifications of bastard births.
Several Massachusetts cases shed light on the role of bastardy in the
administration of stiffer penalties. In 1678, a jury convicted Ellinor
May of "whoredom and of having a bastard child in her husband's
absence.,212 She was sentenced "to be tied to a cart's tail and
205. OXFORDSHiRE RECORDS, supra note 83, at 276.
206. Id. at 191.
207. 1L
208. 1l at 190-91.
209. The Elizabethan poor law, 18 Eliz. 1, ch. 3 (1576) (Eng.), for example, "punished
parents of bastard children who 'defrauded' the parish of its capacity to relieve the 'true poor'
by thrusting destitute infants upon the local charity." PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MUR-
DERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND, 1558-1803, at 13 (1981).
The fathers of these children fled or disputed paternity, leaving the mothers to face public
humiliation for placing "great dishonor" on the parish and the nation. Id.
210. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 336.
211. For example, in the Attkinson case, the accused woman testified to the existence of a
bastard child after her lover denied committing adultery with her. See 5 PLYMOUTH RECORDS,
supra note 142, at 81; see also supra notes 142-145, 155-157, 187-188 and accompanying text.
212. 1 MASSACHUSETrS COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 148, at 138.
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whipped upon her naked body thirty-nine stripes well and severely
laid on and also to depart out of the town of Boston within ten days
and not to return again without license ....213 The Massachusetts
Bay people who suffered banishment, the official punishment for
adultery in that colony after 1638, had usually aggravated their crime
with other bad acts. For instance, one adulterer banished in 1675 was
also convicted of "contemptuous carriage," for which he had his ear
nailed to the pillory.214 Repeat offenders often got more severe
punishments than did first-timers. 215 Ellinor May's banishment for
adultery thus represented a compromise between the death penalty
(imposed upon the mother of a bastard only once in New
England2 16) and a punishment that did not reflect the additional
grievance occasioned by her pregnancy.
Banishment solved an economic problem left unresolved by capital
punishment: It removed two hungry mouths from the community. As
the case of Elizabeth Johnson in Connecticut demonstrated, senten-
cing a mother to die burdened those close to her with the upbringing
of her child. Ambiguous as to Johnson's last moments, or indeed
whether she was executed at all,217 the Connecticut records clearly
testify to the money and effort expended to insure that "Nathaniell
Rescew should have Goodwife Johnson's child, which was born in
prison, as an apprentice to him, til he is of the age of twenty-one
years. q1218
4. Religious and Political Dissidents
A woman like Elizabeth Johnson might alienate the community by
having a bastard that she could not afford to raise, but a reputation
as an outsider or troublemaker was not a risk reserved for women or
nonwhites. The only man executed for adultery in New England
seems to have ensured the death penalty for himself and his lover
with his religious dissidence. A close reading of the Britton-Latham
213. Id
214. Id at 56. This defendant, Maurice Brett, had also come before the court on murder
charges, for which he was acquitted, and his trail of diverse court appearances was probably
viewed as a sign of hard-core criminality rather than of mere moral weakness. See id. at 51.
215. In Maine, for example, Mary Puddington had to ask forgiveness publicly for committing
adultery with George Burdett-a much lighter punishment than the whipping inflicted upon
Mary Batcheller, a minister's wife repeatedly before the court for affairs with several men. See
1 MAINE RECORDS, supra note 133, at 74, 146, 164, 170, 176, 180.
216. See infra notes 217-218 (discussing Elizabeth Johnson, who bore a bastard child while
in prison for adultery with Thomas Newton).
217. See Holdsworth, supra note 120, at 405 (suggesting that Elizabeth Johnson was still alive
in 1655, five years after a cryptic entry in the New Haven town records indicated that an
adultery defendant, often presumed to be Elizabeth, was executed in Connecticut). But see
NORTON, supra note 2, at 468 n.68 (disagreeing with Holdsworth).
218. 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT PRIOR TO THE UNION
wrrH NEW HAVEN COLONY 222 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons 1850).
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case of 1643-1644, to which Norton devotes only a brief
paragraph,219 demonstrates that, although adultery charges some-
times became intertwined with high politics, northern magistrates
distinguished between problems dividing the family and those
afflicting the state. They saw sexual misconduct as a sin that required
correction but did not necessarily equate it with calculated political or
religious disobedience.
James Britton spoke against the church in Massachusetts Bay and
was also "ill affected" toward the civil government.' In March
1639, he was whipped for criticizing and being an enemy to the
ministry." His lover Mary Latham also confessed to misconduct
that strained communal norms. According to Winthrop, she "did fre-
quently abuse her husband, setting a knife to his breast and
threatening to kill him, calling him old rogue and cuckold, and...
[saying] she would make him wear horns as big as a bull."2' She
ultimately accused twelve men besides Britton of committing adultery
with her.'2 Yet, in describing the death of Britton and his lover,
Winthrop reserved special sympathy for the woman. The words he
chose to describe Mary ("very penitent" 224 and "a proper young
woman"2') contrasted with those applied to the "dissolute" Britton,
who had lost "both power and profession of godliness."2 6 Although
the authorities apprehended five of the accused men, only Britton and
Mary suffered death.227 The contrast between the lenient treatment
of the other defendants and Britton's notorious demise underscores
the vital role that Britton's political and religious dissidence played in
the outcome of the case.
The humble demeanor that Mary exhibited on the scaffold suited
Winthrop's admonitory narrative: She died a submissive female,
repudiating her rebellious life and giving Winthrop "some comfortable
hope of pardon of her sin."2' But the chief explanation for his
gentler tone toward the woman recalls the mens rea issue that Herrup
219. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 324.
220. JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP, supra note 146, at 500; see also WILLIAM HUBBARD,
A GENERAL HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM THE DISCOVERY UNTIL 1680 (Massachusetts
Historical Soc'y Collections, 2d ser., No. 6, Boston, Charles C. little & James Brown 1818)
(1815); COTrON MATHER, PILLARS OF SALT: AN HISTORY OF SOME CRIMINALS EXECUTED
IN THIS LAND FOR CAPITAL CRIMES, WITH SOME OF THEIR DYING SPEECHES 62-63 (Boston,
B. Green & J. Allen 1699).
221. See JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP, supra note 146, at 500 n.99.
222. Id. at 501.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 502.
225. Id. at 500.
226. Id. at 502.
227. See id.
228. Id.
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identified in Sussex.229 Winthrop noted that, "against her friends'
minds," Mary had become the wife of "an ancient man who had
neither honesty nor ability, and one [unto] whom she had no
affection."'  While Britton's appeal raised a controversy over
"whether adultery was death by God's law now,"" it was Mary's
moral weakness, rather than Britton's overt challenge to the regime,
that constituted the lesser and more excusable crime. The fact that
Winthrop differentiated between Mary and her lover-the wayward
wife and the religious dissident-indicates that familial and political
disorder called for different analyses.
We have seen that law enforcement depended on the cooperation
of ordinary people, but it would be incorrect to assume that juries
always had more sympathy for sexual offenders than the magistrates
did. Winthrop noted that "some of the magistrates thought the
evidence not sufficient against [Latham], because there were not two
direct witnesses; but the jury cast her, and then she confessed the fact
.... 232 Indeed, the Latham case shows that the controversy over
Old Testament punishments in New England did not cleanly divide
magistrates from villagers any more than it pitted Filmer against
Locke.
III. CONCLUSION
Norton's lack of attention to colonial America's English roots
makes things that were old seem new. In the pages of her book, the
willingness of southern authorities to let sexual misconduct go
unprosecuted looks like the beginnings of a radical new separation of
family and state. But the selective enforcement of sexual mores was
not new. It was an old ad hoc response that winked at weaknesses
that jurors, magistrates, and suspected adulterers shared and lashed
out at transgressors who ventured beyond the pale of the community's
moral standards. In the Chesapeake, where men outnumbered
women, people of varying social ranks engaged in sex outside of
monogamous marriages. To keep order, these relationships had to be
tolerated. Yet, rather than heralding a sea change in political
philosophy, the reluctance of the southern courts to prosecute
otherwise well-respected individuals for consensual sex offenses
echoed the sentiments of English people half a century earlier.
229. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
230. l& at 501. Note that Winthrop's low opinion of the husband in this case harmonizes
with traditional popular scorn toward cuckolds.
231. Id. at 502.
232. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
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By imposing the death penalty for adultery, the colonial
magistrates, like English Puritans during the Commonwealth, bucked
traditional modes of discretionary justice and strained popular
willingness to punish local people. Yet the tough evidentiary
requirements built into the capital adultery laws meant that, in actual
practice, communities continued selectively to prosecute marginal
figures and to find excuses to reduce or drop the charges against well-
liked individuals. The desire for social stability underlying these
decisions owed little to political theory; rather, an intricate web of
religious, economic, and racial considerations combined with less
easily quantifiable personal ties to determine the outcome of adultery
cases.
Founding Mothers and Fathers uncovers valuable information about
sexual mores in the Chesapeake. When Norton moves beyond the
confines of a local study to explain how the family became a private
realm, however, she falls considerably short of the mark. The cultural
change she seeks to identify did not occur in the mid-seventeenth
century. Like the efforts of English churchwardens to shield upstand-
ing citizens who got into sexual scrapes, lax moral enforcement in
Maryland and Virginia was an old means of preserving good will
among neighbors.
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